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Corporate Criminal Liability:
Toward a Compliance-Orientated Approach
GUSTAVO A. JIMENEZ*
ABSTRACT
Under U.S. federal law, a corporation can be held criminally liable for
the crimes of its employees and agents. The Department of Justice's U.S.
Attorneys' Manual lays out a list of factors prosecutors can evaluate when
deciding whether or not to prosecute a corporate entity. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) prosecutors have various tools at their disposal, including
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs) as alternatives to going to trial. Prosecutors have used DPAs and
NPAs in recent cases, allowing the government to ensure that corporate
entities comply with investigations, enact compliance programs, and
continue to follow laws and regulations. The use of DPAs and NPAs are on
the rise, and these agreements are now used in cases concerning the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the U.S. Commodity Future
Trading Commission (CFTC). Comments from the Trump Administration
suggest that these agreements will continue to be used to deter corporate
criminal misconduct. Many Latin American countries have recently
enacted laws to impose corporate criminal liability and use some type of
compliance-based program to help deter future wrongdoing. Mexico, in
particular, has recently amended its Federal Penal Code to prosecute and
punish corporate entities. Since the Mexican case law in this area is still
developing, it is very important that Mexico adopt deferred prosecution
agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or a variation thereof that
require compliance programs to enhance the public perception of the
Mexican government and the judiciary. Mexico is just one of many
countries amending its laws, suggesting a shift toward an implied
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understanding of the importance of a compliance-oriented approach.
Foreign jurisdictions and the U.S. DOJ continue to enact programs to help
regulate laws and deter criminal activity in many industries. The
acceptance of the corporate criminal liability doctrine in several
jurisdictions promotes the public interest and the integrity of the legal
system, deters future illegal activity, and helps ensure corporate
compliance with the law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The misdeeds of a corporation can lead to criminal liability. Corporate
entities found to be engaged in wrongdoing can be sanctioned and punished
under both civil and criminal law. The theory behind the doctrine of
corporate criminal liability is that a corporation is considered a "person"
that can only act through the actions of its employees. 1 Various countries
have addressed corporate criminal liability in a way that shows they too
are moving toward accepting the doctrine and a compliance-oriented
approach.
In this paper, I discuss how the United States and some Latin
American countries address corporate criminal liability and propose my
view on how deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs) serve an important function in creating
effective compliance-based programs in the United States. By looking at
various laws in foreign jurisdictions relating to corporate criminal
liability, I propose there is a possible global convergence in the norms
around the doctrine and that the shift toward compliance programs
achieves one of the main purposes of criminal law-deterrence.
In Part II, I give a general overview of the corporate criminal
liability doctrine in the United States, including a discussion of the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual and the guidelines set out by the DOJ for
prosecuting corporate entities. Part III discusses both DPAs and NPAs
as tools prosecutors have at their disposal when prosecuting corporate
entities, including a discussion of recent cases and the perception of
these types of agreements. In Part IV, I give a general overview of
corporate criminal liability in some Latin American countries, discuss
how the doctrine has developed in these jurisdictions, and illustrate how
these laws also show a shift toward a compliance-oriented approach for
the laws in Latin American countries. Mexico, in particular, has just
amended its anti-corruption laws, including reforms that now impose
corporate criminal liability. In Part V, I examine the corporate criminal
1. See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 410, 412 (2007).
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liability doctrine, or variations of it, in foreign jurisdictions to propose
that there is a possible global convergence around norms with respect to
substantive issues that affect the corporate criminal liability doctrine.
This convergence shows a shift toward a compliance-oriented approach
that could help solve the problem of corporate entities' criminal actions
in many industries and jurisdictions.
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. General Overview of the U.S. Federal Law
Under the common law, a corporation could not be held criminally
liable for the acts of its constituents.2 Under the common law, a corporation
was not a person; therefore, it could not be held criminally liable. Following
a series of Supreme Court decisions, the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability became an accepted rule under the theory of civil vicarious
liability. 3 After the Supreme Court stated it saw no objection to the law for
holding a corporation criminally liable for the transactions of its agents in
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, federal courts
accepted the idea of holding corporate entities criminally liable.4 One of
these early cases was Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States in which a steamship
corporation was convicted for violating a statute that barred dumping
refuse in navigable waters. 5 The Supreme Court stated that the steamship
corporation was liable because its officers ultimately "failed to prevent the
commission of the forbidden act."6 Corporate criminal liability continued to
develop through judicial interpretation and the existing statutory law to
become an accepted doctrine imposed to regulate a corporation's actions. 7
Under current U.S. federal law, a corporation can be held criminally
liable for the crimes its employees and agents commit in the corporation's
interest.8 Corporate criminal liability can be imposed for regulatory
offenses, economic offenses, and common law crimes.9 Corporate criminal
liability is confined to the following offenses: those committed by "(a) the
2. See Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial
Abuse in the Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 230, 232 (2009).
3. See id. at 233-34; see also N. Y Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States,
212 U.S. 481 (1909).
4. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 1, at 421.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See Corporate Criminal Liability Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (Nov. 2,
2018), https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/corporate-criminal-liability/.
8. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43293, CORPORATION CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW 1 (2013).
9. See id.
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corporation's officers, employees, or agents; (b) within the scope of their
employment; and (c) at least in part for the benefit of the corporation." 10
Thus, under principles of respondeat superior, a corporation is vicariously
criminally liable for the illegal acts of its employees. 1  The test to determine
the scope of authority is whether an individual is (1) performing acts within
his or her general line of work and (2) if the acts are motivated at least in
part with in the intent to benefit the corporation. 12
The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, imposes corporate
criminal liability for the acts and misconduct of a corporation's senior
management officials (the acts of lower level employees will not always
be enough). 13 Some states have chosen not to follow the federal approach
and have opted for an approach similar to the Model Penal Code's
approach. 14
The DOJ decides whether to prosecute a corporation, its employees,
or both for their criminal acts. 15 The DOJ has two sets of guidelines that
govern the decision on whether to prosecute: the Principles of Federal
Prosecution and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations. 16 The DOJ aims to promote the public interest, deter
future illegal acts, ensure corporate compliance with the law, and
promote the integrity of our legal system 17 by holding both corporate
10. Id. at 3.
1i. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 10 (2016),
https://www.cliffordehance.com/briefings/2016/04/corporate-criminalliability.html.
12. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 3; see also United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541,
552-53 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Typically, [t]he test is whether the agent is performing acts of the
kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts are motivated -- at least in part --
by an intent to benefit the corporation." (quoting United States v. Potter 463 F.3d. 9, 25
(1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 3-4; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM. L. INST. 1985)
('A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if (a) the offense is a violation.
m . in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the
conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within
the scope of his office or employment ... (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty or affirmative performance imposed on corporation by law; or (c) the commission of
the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the
board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment. (2) When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of
an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, unless
the contrary plainly appears.. ").
14. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 1, at 423.
15. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 8.
16. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§9-27.000-28.000 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 2018),
available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/title-9-criminal; see also § 9-28.200 n. 1 ("While
these guidelines refer to corporations, they apply to the consideration of the prosecution of
all types of business organizations, including partnerships, sole proprietorships,
government entities, and unincorporated associations.").
17. See USAM, supra note 16, at § 9-28.010.
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entities and individuals who engage in wrongdoing criminally liable.
B. Factors to be Considered and the DOJ Guidelines
There are several factors that prosecutors consider when deciding
whether to prosecute a corporation. 18 The factors are similar to those
prosecutors consider when deciding whether to prosecute an
individual. 19 Prosecutors also look into the seriousness of the offense
committed and the culpability of the defendants. 20 The factors
prosecutors weigh include:2 1
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense; 22
2. the pervasiveness of the corporation's wrongdoing; 23
3. any history of the corporation engaging in similar misconduct; 24
4. the corporation's willingness to cooperate in investigations and
timely disclosures of wrongdoing; 25
5. the existence and effectiveness of a corporation's compliance
program, including efforts to implement or improve an existing
one;
2 6
6. collateral consequences; 27 and
7. the adequacy of remedies. 28
The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations is
very clear as to the amount of discretion prosecutors are afforded in
making their determination. 29 Under each of the factors, there are
considerations a prosecutor can take into account. For instance, when
looking at the nature and seriousness of the crime, there are policy
concerns, including the consequences and harm from the company's
wrongful actions.30 Prosecutors will look into the policy goals and
18. See id. at § 9-28.300.
19. See id. ("The sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success at trial; the
probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction.")
20. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 8.
21. See USAM, supra note 16, at § 9-28.000 (the factors are illustrative and do not
represent an exhaustive list of factors that a prosecutor can find relevant under her or her
discretion).
22. See id. at § 9-28.400.
23. See id. at § 9-28.500.
24. See id. at § 9-28.600.
25. See id. at § 9-28.700, § 9-28.900.
26. See id. at § 9-28.800, § 9-28.1000.
27. See id. at § 9-28.1100.
28. See id. at § 9-28.1200, 9-28.1300.
29. For a detailed explanation of the guidelines, see id. at § 9-28. 00.
30. See id. at § 9-28.400[B].
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incentive programs set up by regulatory agencies when assessing this
factor.31
When prosecutors examine the pervasiveness of wrongdoing, a critical
factor is the role and conduct of management, their degree of responsibility,
and their authority. 32 Prosecutors will examine the number of employees
engaged in the misconduct or if the misconduct was contained to a small
number of upper management personnel to determine if it is appropriate to
impose corporate liability.33
When prosecutors review the company's past criminal conduct, any
past civil or regulatory enforcement actions can be taken into account. 34
The fact that a company has a compliance program in place does not
absolve it from criminal liability. Prosecutors can evaluate the
effectiveness of this plan in detecting and reducing wrongful acts as well
as whether the compliance program merely exists on paper without
actually being implemented. 35 When prosecutors look at the collateral
consequences, they may take into account possible substantial
consequences to a corporation's employees, investors, pensioners, and
customers, and the role those individuals had in the criminal
wrongdoing, if any.36
According to the DOJ Prosecutorial Guidelines, once a prosecutor
decides to charge a corporation, the prosecutor should charge the
corporation with the most serious offense consistent with the nature of
the defendant's criminal acts that is likely to result in a conviction. 37
It is important to note that the Guidelines are not legally binding
and do not have the force of the law behind them-they are strictly
guidelines. 38
Once a prosecutor decides to prosecute a corporate entity, there are
various alternatives to trial that the prosecutor can take. For instance, a
corporation can plead guilty and seek a plea to the alleged offense. 39
Some of the other alternatives include: deferring prosecution under a
31. See id.
32. See id. at § 9-28.500[B].
33. See id. at § 9-28.500[A].
34. DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9-10.
35. See USAM, supra note 16, at § 9-28.800[B]. ("[T]he critical factors in evaluating
any program are whether the program is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness
in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees and whether corporate
management is enforcing the program or is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to
engage in misconduct to achieve business objectives").
36. See id. at § 9-28.1100[B].
37. See id. at § 9-28.1400.
38. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 2, at 259 (They provide the Department of Justice with
guidance and "are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural enforceable at law by any party in a manner civil or criminal.").
39. DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11; see also, USAM, supra note 16, at § 9-28.1500.
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DPA; accepting a corporation's offer to sign a NPA with the intent to
prosecute corporate officials and/or employees; or foregoing criminal
prosecution while agreeing to civil sanctions (when criminal misconduct
occurs in the regulatory context). 40
III. DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS
A. General Overview
A deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is filed in court and
privately negotiated.41 The Department of Justice (DOJ) agrees to defer
prosecution in exchange for the company's acknowledgment of
responsibility for the alleged conduct while agreeing to take compliance-
oriented actions.42 Some of the terms that DPAs include are:
(1) An acknowledgement of responsibility for the conduct; (2)
an acknowledgement that if the defendant commits similar
conduct during the pendency of the agreement that the
Government may prosecute for any crime including the
subject matter of the agreement; (3) an obligation to
cooperate with the Government's continuing investigation
including making current employees available for testimony;
(4) waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial and
defenses created by any relevant statute of limitations; (5)
language that prohibits the defendant from making
contradictory factual representations as those found in the
agreement; and (6) the imposition of penalties, fines,
restitution and other remedial relief (emphasis added).43
Non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) are negotiated between the
DOJ and the corporate entity. NPAs are less detailed than DPAs. 44
While there are no formal filing charges under a NPA, the DOJ and
corporate defendant enter into an agreement that takes the form of a
40. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11.
41. See id. at 12.
42. Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 505
(2015).
43. Stephen L. Hill, Jr. & Emma Radmore, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The US
Experience and the UK Potential, LEXOLOGY (July 14, 2014),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g-4f0cc529-bfdb-49c3-ac8d-e989e87fc84a.
44. See Koehler, supra note 42, at 505.
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letter wherein the corporation agrees to cooperate with the government
and take remedial actions necessary to correct the wrongdoing. 45
One of the reasons a corporate entity may elect to choose a DPA or a
NPA is that an indictment to the corporation threatens to put it out of
business. 46 For example, in 2002, Arthur Anderson, one of the top
accounting firms in the world, was indicted and ultimately convicted for
obstruction of justice for destroying evidence in relation to the Enron
scandal. 47 The decision was overturned by the Supreme Court but not
before the collapse of the $9.3 billion corporation with over 85,000
employees worldwide.48  From Arthur Anderson's collapse, many
companies now fear that a conviction would be a threat to their
existence, creating a strong incentive to choose to elect either a deferred
prosecution agreement or a non-prosecution agreement.
The increase in the use of DPAs and NPAs is in line with the founding
principles of corporate prosecution, as laid out in the U.S. Attorney's
Manual.49 Because these agreements contain provisions for the company to
cooperate with the government's ongoing investigations and the
implementation of compliance programs, DPAs and NPAs achieve one of
the main purposes of criminal law-deterrence. 50
45. See Lawrence E. Ritchie et al., DOJ Enters into Non-Prosecution Agreement with Las
Vegas Sands Corporations Over Alleged FCPA Violations, OSLER (Feb 3, 2017),
https://www.osler.com/en/blogs/risk/february-2017/doj-enters-into-non-prosecution-agreement-
with-las. For a sample of a non-prosecution agreement see, https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/86877 1/download.
46. See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 12.
47. See Len Lyons & Audra Marino, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution
Agreements and Monitoring Services, MARCUM LLP (Aug. 2012),
http://www.marcumllp.com/insights-news/deferred-prosecution-agreements-non-
prosecution-agreements-and-monitoring-services; see also Arthur Anderson Indicted in
Enron Case, ABC NEWS (March 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/storyid-87293
&pagel; see generally Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: The
Overview; Arthur Anderson Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-
andersen-fires-executive-for-enron-orders.html (providing an overview of the Enron case).
48. See Lyons & Marino, supra note 47.
49. See USAM, supra note 16, at § 9-28.100 ("These interests include, among other
things: (1) protecting the integrity of our economic and capital markets by enforcing the
rule of law; (2) protecting consumers, investors, and business entities against competitors
who gain unfair advantage by violating the law; (3) preventing violations of environmental
laws; and (4) discouraging business practices that would permit or promote unlawful
conduct at the expense of the public interest").
50. See Bruce Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary, 29 SMU L.
Rev. 908, 925 (1975).
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1. Non-Prosecution Agreement Cases
NPAs encourage deterrence of a company's wrongdoing by providing
law enforcement with the ability to impose mandates on companies that
will change their behavior, force the corporate entities to cooperate with the
law enforcement investigations, and require the corporate entity to improve
their compliance programs. 51
A case to illustrate this point is the NPA reached after the death of
twenty-nine miners at the Massey Energy Upper Big Branch (Massey)
mine near Montcoal, West Virginia. An explosion resulting from the
ignition of the accumulation of methane from the lack of proper safety
protocols killed the miners. 52 Massey was aware of its poor safety
methods and environmental record, including its concealment of safety
violations from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).53
Massey intimidated workers to keep them from reporting violations and
kept two sets of books-one with the violations that the company was
aware of and one it presented to safety inspectors that omitted the
known violations. 54 The DOJ indicted Massey's head of security "for
lying about the practice of giving advance notice of inspections [to its
employees] and attempting to destroy evidence".55 The DOJ charged
several of the upper management personnel,56 which showed that even
if there were no formal charges filed against the corporation, the heads
of the company would not escape prosecution for voluntarily
disregarding regulatory procedures.
The DOJ announced that it was entering into a NPA with Massey
and would not bring criminal charges against the company. The DOJ
justified its decision on the fact that the company had agreed to
implement compliance programs. 57 While critics can argue that the lack
of a guilty plea or admission of liability did not allow justice to be served
where a corporation failed to follow regulations, the consequences of the
NPA allowed the government to require Massey to undertake
compliance efforts. In addition, these agreements are often made public,
which sends a message to other companies about the consequences they
may face if they also willfully disregard existing laws and regulations.
Another example in which the DOJ entered into a NPA involves the
51. See Ritchie et al., supra note 45.
52. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2013).
53. See id. at 1296.
54. See id. at 1297.
55. See id. at 1298.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1300.
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Las Vegas Sands Corporation (Las Vegas Sands). 58 Under the NPA, the
company agreed to pay a criminal penalty of almost $7 million after
admitting that many of its management and executive personnel knew
they had failed to implement a legitimate system of internal accounting
controls. 59 Las Vegas Sands admitted to "ignoring warnings from its
financial staff and an outside auditor about the payments, and fired the
employee who raised concerns about the payments."6 0 This case shows
how a NPA still allows a company to acknowledge its responsibility in
the criminal misconduct and requires the company to pay fines for its
actions. Thus, despite no formal charges being filed in court, the
corporate entity is not completely absolved from its wrongdoing.
2. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Cases
The policy consideration behind DPAs is simple: companies are to
comply with the provisions laid out in the agreements, and if the
conditions set forth are not met to the satisfaction of the government,
the DOJ will take action.
For example, in 2012, Zimmer Biomet, a medical device company,
reached a DPA with the DOJ in which it agreed to pay over $22 million
in penalties, implement internal controls, and retain a compliance
monitor for a period of eighteen months.6 1 In June 2017, the company
violated its DPA for failing to maintain its compliance program by
failing to monitor internal controls in its activity overseas and is now
facing criminal prosecution.6 2 This is one instance demonstrating that
the DOJ will not let companies escape prosecution should they not
uphold their part of the agreement.
The DOJ also entered into DPAs with two corporations earlier this
year. On January 18, 2018, HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC) entered into a
DPA with the DOJ Fraud Section regarding two counts of alleged wire
fraud.63 The DOJ considered several factors in reaching a resolution and
ultimately imposed a $63.1 million penalty on the corporation to be paid
58. See Ritchie et al., supra note 45.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Amirah Al Idrus, Zimmer Biomet Broke Deferred Prosecution Agreement with
DOJ:. Reuters, FIERCEBIOTECH (June 15, 2016, 11:42 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com
/medical-devices/zimmer-biormet-broke -deferred-prosecution-agreement-doj -reuters.
62. See id.
63. See F. Joseph Warin et al., 2018 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution
Agreements (NPAs) and
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 10, 2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-mid-year-npa-dpa-update/.
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to the U.S. Treasury.6 4 On February 12, 2018, U.S. Bancorp (USB) also
entered into a DPA with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York for criminal charges for "failing to maintain an
adequate anti-money laundering program and willfully failing to file a
Suspicious Activity Report." 65 As part of the DPA, USB was fined for
$528 million.66 These cases are some examples of how DPAs can induce
monetary resolutions.
B. The Use of DPAs and NPAs
A corporation, by its nature, cannot be put away in the same way
one would lock away an individual. However, DPAs and NPAs give
prosecutors effective tools to deter companies by shifting the focus from
acts of misconduct to a compliance-oriented approach. Corporations and
their management are not let off the hook that easily.
These agreements protect consumers, investors, and business
entities against competitors who gain an unfair advantage by violating
the law by subjecting them to penalties and sanctions. This was
certainly the case for Las Vegas Sands, which ended up paying $6.96
million and agreed to continued cooperation with the DOJ.6 7 In another
case, State Street Corporation agreed to pay $32.3 million in criminal
penalties when it entered into a DPA as a result of its fraud schemes
aimed at charging clients unwarranted commissions.6 8 According to
Acting Assistant Attorney General David Bitokwer, "the bank
fundamentally abused its clients' trust and inflicted very real financial
losses."6 9 The message these agreements send to other companies is
clear-the DOJ will not just come after the company and let the guilty
individuals avoid responsibility.
These agreements also pressure upper management personnel to
ensure they implement policies that are in line with regulations, not
only because their jobs and careers may be on the line, but also because
they may face criminal prosecution. For example, the DOJ reached a
DPA with the accounting firm KPMG for participating in a scheme
attempting to defraud the IRS by "devising, marketing, and
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Ritchie et al., supra note 45.
68. See Office of Public Affairs, State Street Corporation Agrees to Pay More than $64 Million
to Resolve Fraud Charges, DEPT OF JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/state-
street-corporation-agrees-pay-more-64-million-resolve-fraud-charges.
69. Id.
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implementing fraudulent tax shelters."7 0 The company's former deputy
chairman and many of its officials were prosecuted and indicted, and
the company paid $456 million in fines. 71
In a different case, Sheffield Pharmaceutical's former president and
chief executive officer were charged with a felony for violating the Clean
Water Act by "discharging polluted industrial wastewater from its New
London Factory into the municipal sewage system without the required
permit and industrial wastewater treatment system."7 2 The former
president and chief executive officer pled guilty and received three years
of probation, a $30,000 fine, and community service.7 3 The court ordered
Sheffield Pharmaceutical to pay $1 million and comply with all the
environmental laws and regulations as part of the DPA.74
As illustrated with the cases above, under these agreements,
prosecutors can ensure that if the management of a corporation doesn't
comply with regulations, they will not be able to escape prosecution by
pinning the blame on the corporation itself, nor will they be able to keep
their respective positions and be subjected to fines. The use of DPAs and
NPAs further illustrate the deterrence mechanism on corporations and
their management.
C. DPA and NPA with respect to the FCPA
There are certain situations in which it has been argued that the
frequent use of DPAs and NPAs basically prevents the courts from
resolving serious issues about the appropriate scope of a criminal
statute. One of those situations is with respect to the DOd's enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA was "enacted
for the purposes of making it unlawful for certain classes of people and
entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in
obtaining or retaining business." 75 The anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA apply to all U.S. persons, foreign firms, and persons who, directly
or through their agents, act in furtherance of a corrupt payment within
70. Terry Frieden, Justice Department Indicts Eight Ex-KPMG Execs: Firms Agrees to
Pay $456 Million Fine, CNN.COM INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 29, 2005, 11:34 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/29/kpmg.justice/.
71. See id.
72. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF CRIM. ENF'T, FORENSICS AND TRAINING,
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES CASE BULLETIN 8, (2016) https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/201701/documents/december_2016_enviro crimes case bulletin.pdf.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUST. (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.
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U.S. territory. 76
Enforcement actions brought under the FCPA have been expanding,
but the legal realm is a "legal desert" due to the lack of binding case
law.77 There is no concrete guidance as to many of the ambiguities
surrounding the statutory language of the FCPA.78 One of the main
reasons for the lack of legal binding precedent is because DPAs and
NPAs have kept cases away from court and prevented corporations from
dealing with the consequences of a guilty conviction. 79 Instead, many
FCPA cases are resolved through settlements. 80
There are a few possible explanations for why the use of DPAs and
NPAs will likely continue to increase in FCPA actions in the coming
years. One is the fact that FCPA violations require some activity to
occur outside of U.S. territory, meaning that there would likely be
increases in the costs of investigations of violations in more than one
jurisdiction. 81 Thus, corporations may elect to pay fines to the DOJ and
its foreign counterparts as part of a settlement and resolve the matter.
For instance, the corporation Siemens ultimately paid millions in fines
to the DOJ to settle charges and will also be paying $569 million to the
Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich for bribes in other
transactions worldwide.82
Another consideration for the increase in the use of DPAs and NPAs
in FCPA cases is the fact that FCPA cases might have greater negative
reputational consequences to corporations than generic white collar
crimes. 83 Attorney General Jeff Sessions laid out an important
consideration for law enforcement of the FCPA. He stated that
corruption increases the cost of doing business, and proper enforcement
protects honest companies from competitors who pay bribes to try to get
ahead.84 With heavy enforcement in this area, it is very possible that
the case law surrounding FCPA violations will remain undeveloped and
continue to draw guidance from enforcement actions and settlements if
76. See id.
77. Nick Gersh, The Curious Absence of FCPA Trials, GAB: THE GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Sept. 8, 2017), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/tag/non-
prosecution-agreements/.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
294.htm.
83. See Gersh, supra note 77.
84. See Richard L. Cassin, AG Sessions: 'We Will Continue to Strongly Enforce the
FCPA', FCPA BLOG (Apr. 25, 2017, 7:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/4/25/ag-
sessions-we-will-continue-to-strongly-enforce-the-fcpa.html.
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the courts are kept from establishing binding legal precedent.
D. Are DPAs and NPAs here to Stay?
As of July 2018, the DOJ has entered into six NPAs and six DPAs
for a total of twelve agreements.8 5 This six-month period should not be
taken to show any trend, as the DOJ entered into 102 of these
agreements in 2015, and then dropped to thirty-nine agreements in
2016.86 In 2017, the total number of agreements was twenty-two, and at
the six-month period the number of agreements was only ten.8 7 This
suggests that there might be an increase in the number of agreements
that are entered into this year.
Chart 1: Corporate NPAs and DPAs. 2000-2018 YTD
120 l
_102
40 1
56 2522
Mote: The SEC enter ed in to ten of the abovew coipoirate NPAs5 and 11PM : 2010 (1),
2011 (3), 2012 (1), 2013 (1), 2014 (1), 2015(1), and 2016 (2).
Source: Cibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The chart shows all known
corporate NPAs and DPAs since 2000.
It certainly seems that the current administration will continue to
use DPAs and NPAs. It would not be surprising if the number of
agreements in 2018 is larger than the number of agreements in 2017.
85. Id. at 1.
86. See id. at 2.
87. See F. Joseph Warmn et al., 2017 Mid- Year Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution
Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 11,
2017), https://www. gibsondunn.com/20 17-mid-year-update-on-corporate-non-prosecution-
agreements-npas-and-deferred-prosecution-agreements-dpas/.
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Recent speeches from both Attorney General Sessions 88 and Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein seem to suggest that they will
continue to take a tough but fair stance on the prosecution of both
corporate entities and white collar crimes. 89
During the Ethics and Compliance Initiative Annual Conference on
April 24, 2017, Attorney General Sessions focused on the importance of
compliance and stated that when the DOJ makes charging decisions,
the DOJ will take into account the corporation's cooperation in
government investigations and its compliance programs. 90 Attorney
General Sessions referred to the NPAs and the DPAs as tools at the
DOJFs disposal, suggesting that these agreements will continue to be
used in an effort to have companies create good compliance programs.
On May 9, 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
announced a new policy imposing penalties on corporations at the New
York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute.9 1 The DOd's recent
amendments discourage the "piling on" of penalties relating to the same
misconduct, which results from the lack of coordination among
enforcement agencies when imposing such penalties. 92 This new policy
comes with four features in an effort to "discourage disproportionate
enforcement of laws by multiple authorities," to provide certainty and
finality of penalties that are imposed on a corporation, and to encourage
a fair and just result when resolving a case using a DPA or NPA.93
These comments suggest that the DOJ will continue to pursue
corporations for any wrongdoings, use corporate compliance programs
as a deterrent, and properly coordinate agencies in order to reach
equitable results.
IV. CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Corporate Criminal Liability in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile
With the future pointing to the continued use of corporate non-
prosecution agreements (NPA) and deferred prosecution agreements
(DPA) in the United States, many Latin American countries' enactment
88. See id.
89. See id.; Warin et al., supra note 63, at 3.
90. See Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks at the Ethics and Compliance Initiative
Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 2017) transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/attorney-general-j eff- sessions-delivers-remarks-ethics-and-compliance-
initiative- annual.
91. See Warin et al., supra note 88.
92. Warin et al., supra note 63, at 3.
93. Id.
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of corporate criminal liability doctrines show the importance of the
doctrine abroad. I will examine four countries in Latin America that
have enacted laws holding corporations liable in various industries to
demonstrate a trend toward compliance through cooperation with
governments and authorities.
In Brazil, the Brazilian Clean Companies Act ((Law No. 12,846) took
effect on January 29, 2014 to hold a corporation liable for the corrupt
actions of its employees.9 4 The act is an anti-bribery statute that sends a
clear signal to companies in Brazil that the Brazilian government is
cracking down on corruption. 95 Any company that violates this act can
be sanctioned up to $27 million but can mitigate their fines if they
cooperate with Brazilian authorities and implement effective
compliance programs in accordance with the act.96
On November 8, 2017, the Argentine Congress approved a law
establishing corporate criminal liability for crimes against public
administration and international bribery.97 Some of the features of the
law include holding private legal entities liable, holding entities liable
when crimes are committed for a benefit, and holding successors
liable.98 When a corporate entity violates the law they can be punished
up to two to five times the benefit they obtained, fully or partially
suspended for up to ten years, liquidated, forced to forfeit any goods or
assets obtained during the violation, and barred from entering into
public contracts.9 9
94. See Gabriela Roitburd, Preparing to Comply with Brazil's Clean Companies Act,
Association of Corporate Counsel, https://www.acc.com/accdocket/onlineexclusives/brazil-
cca.cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2018). Brazil Compliance Guide, GAN Bus. ANTI-CORRUPTION
PORTAL: COMPLIANCE GUIDES (Nov. 2015), http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/
compliance-quick-guides/brazil.
95. See id.; See also Renata Muzzi Gomes de Almeida & Shin Jae Kim, The New
Brazilian Clean Company Act, EMPEA: LEGAL & REG. BULL. 2 (2014),
https://www.empea.org/app/uploads/2017/03/Brazilian-Clean-Company-Act.pdf. The full
text of the act can be accessed here: https://www.cov.com/files/upload/E-
AlertAttachmentBrazilianCleanCompanies Act Original.pdf (discussing how the act
has encouraged the implementation of inti-corruption controls).
96. See Gomes de Almeida & Kim, supra note 96, at 1-2.
97. Maria Lorena Schiariti, Juan Manuel Naveira & Agustina Guazzaroni, Corporate
Criminal Liability Regime, MARVAL O'FARRELL MAIRAL (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.marval.com/publicacion/responsabilidad-penal-para-las-personas-juridicas-
por-delitos-de-corrupcion- 1309 1&lang-en.
98. See id.
99. See id.; see also Fernando Goldaracena & Vanina Caniza, Argentina: New Law of
Corporate Criminal Liability Approved, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS, (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://globalcompliancenews.com/argentina-corporate-criminal-liability-201803 12/
(discussing the penalties provided by the Corporate Criminal Liability Law); Clara
Hudson, Argentina Introduces Corporate Criminal Liability, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV.
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1 150080/argentina-
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The new Argentine law provides several exemptions from penalties
that are in accordance with the trend toward having corporations
implement effective compliance programs. One way is through an
Integrity Program, a type of compliance program "consisting of actions,
mechanisms, and internal proceedings for the promotion of integrity,
supervision and control, focused on the prevention, detection, and
correction of irregularities and unlawful acts." 100 There are minimum
requirements of the Integrity Program and other elements that require
corporate entities to establish a code of ethics that lays out proper
policies and procedures for management. 101 Furthermore, the Argentine
law allows for a corporate legal entity to enter into an Effective
Collaboration Agreement, whereby the entity's penalties are reduced if
they agree to cooperate by providing facts to the authorities to identify
perpetrators, recovering assets, and complying with conditions set forth
in the agreement.102 These programs allow the government to regulate
and deter corporate criminal wrongdoings by incentivizing corporate
entities to enact adequate compliance programs to reduce its penalties.
In Chile, under the Corporate Criminal Liability Law (Ley 20392),
corporate entities may be subject to criminal prosecution as a
consequence of bribery committed by their agents. 103 The theory behind
the Chilean law is to penalize a company for failing to implement and
fulfill its obligations of preventing the crime for which a corporation is
accused.104 When enforcing actions against corporate entities, penalties
and fines can be up to approximately $685,000.105 The Chilean law
explicitly provides credit for corporate compliance programs; 106 this
means Chile is another country that follows a compliance-oriented
approach.
The Chilean law's leniency agreements resemble the DOJ's DPAs
and NPAs. Under these agreements, Chilean law provides for the
conditional suspensions of proceedings that can occur during
introduces-corporate-criminal-liability-law (discussing the penalties provided by the
Corporate Criminal Liability Law).
100. Schiariti, et al., supra note 98.
101. See Mario Eduardo Castro Sammartino, Corporate Criminal Liability in Argentina:
A Short Term to Establish a Proper Compliance Program, CASTRO SAMMARTINO & PIERINI
(Dec. 15, 2017), http://cspabogados.com.ar/en/corporate-criminal-liability-in-argentina/.
102. Schiariti, et al., supra note 98.
103. See Matteson Ellis, Anti-Corruption Laws in Chile: Three Things Companies
Should Know, FCPAMERICAS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-
corruption-compliance/anti-corruption-laws-chile-companies/.
104. See Daniel Praetorius & Jorge Bofill, Anti-Corruption 2017: Chile, LATIN LAW.,
http://latinlawyer.com/jurisdiction/1003067/chile (last verified June 8, 2017).
105. Id.
106. Ellis, supra note 104.
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investigations. 107 A settlement is made between prosecutors and
defendants that determines the conditions that must be met within a
defined period for a defendant to be acquitted. 108 Similar to conditions
set out in DPAs, the conditions or requirements can include the
adoption of a compliance program or an obligation to make restitution
payments. 109
A case example occurred in April 2013 when Chilean authorities
secured a $2.5 million settlement with Industrias Ceresita for alleged
bribery payments to public officials in connection with construction
permits. 110 As part of the settlement, the corporate entity had to adhere
to numerous conditions, including making major infrastructure
improvements in the affected municipality, such as repainting buildings
in the town's main square."n  The Chilean leniency agreements follow
the compliance-oriented approach by punishing corporations when they
violate government-set conditions, but also allowing restitution when
the corporations cooperate.
B. Corporate Criminal Liability in Mexico
The implementation of the National Code of Penal Procedures and
reforms made to the Federal Penal Code in Mexico in June 2016 has
made it so that corporate entities can be prosecuted for criminal acts. 112
Similar to the corporate criminal liability laws in other Latin American
countries, corporate entities in Mexico can mitigate any criminal
liability and sanctions imposed on them by showing that authorized
individuals have taken measures to prevent ongoing, or future, criminal
conduct. 113 Under Article 1 ibis of the Mexican Federal Penal Code, 114 a
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Eduardo Parroquin Patino, Criminal Liability of Entities, LEXOLOGY (July 20,
2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g-a8ca927f-c7ba-4c59-93f3-
Oa6b3dc 155d9.
113. See id.
114. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Corporate Liability for Corruption Offences in
Latin America, OAS 2, 14, http://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/enccompilation.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2018) ("[w]hen a member or a representative of a legal entity, partnership,
corporation or company of any kind, except the institutions of the State, commit a crime
using the means that said entities provide him/her for that purpose, in a way that the
crime be committed in the name of, or under the protection the entity or for its benefit, the
Court shall have the authority, under the cases exclusively specified by the law, to order
within the sentence the suspension or the dissolution of the entity if he deem it necessary
for the sake of public security.").
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corporate entity may be punished for crimes including tax fraud,
narcotics trafficking, bribery, fraud, transactions with illicit funds, and
crimes against the environment.11 5 According to the Mexican Federal
Criminal Code, a judge is able to fine a corporation up to approximately
$4,100,000 and suspend or dissolve the corporation.116 These reforms
are part of Mexico's General Law of the National Anti-Corrupt System,
which includes policies and procedures for the prevention, detention,
and punishment of corrupt acts and administrative offenses. 117
Despite the law's recent enactment, it is clear that the new reforms
are abiding by the notion of corporate cooperation with the government
by enacting proper compliance programs. Similar to the leniency
agreements in Chile, there are leniency mechanisms established in
Mexico's General Law of Administrative Liabilities. Under this law,
corporate entities can receive credit if they choose to cooperate in
reporting misconduct to the government after conducting an
investigation.1 1 8 Any sanctions that an individual may receive can also
be reduced by about 50-70 percent if they cooperate with authorities. 119
Because of the backdrop under which these reforms were made in
Mexico, the case law on corporate criminal liability is in its early stages
of development. 120 Thus, it is important that as cases are brought,
Mexico's authorities use DPAs or leniency agreements to ensure a move
toward a stricter regulatory environment.
When the Mexican government prosecutes a corporate entity,
deferred prosecution-type agreements should be heavily enforced over
non-prosecution-type agreements. When Mexico's current president,
Enrique Pefla Nieto, ran his presidential campaign, he promised to
combat corruption in Mexico. 12 1 Corruption continues to be a risk for
companies operating in Mexico.122
The fact that NPAs do not require formal filing in court may result
115. Patino, supra note 113.
116. See Daniel Maldonado Alcantara, Humberto Morales Barron & Alberto Lascurain,
Anti-Corruption 2018: Mexico, LATIN LAW., http://latinlawyer.com/jurisdiction/1004770/
mexico (last verified Oct. 5, 2017).
117. Id.
118. Matteson Ellis, Important Aspects of Mexico's National Anti-Corruption System,
Part 2, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr.17, 2017), http://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/important-aspects-of-mexicos-national-anti-corruption-system-part-2/.
119. See id.
120. Alcantara et al., supra note 117.
121. See Mauricio Torres, Las 7 Reformas Que Propone Pena Nienot Para Mexico,
EXPANSION EN ALIANZA CON CNN (Aug. 27, 2012, 1:01 PM) (Mex.),
http://expansion.mx/nacional/2012/08/27/una-
reforma-fiscal-integral.
122. See Mexico Corruption Report, GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL,
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/mexico.
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in a continued negative public perception of the Mexican judiciary,
which may decrease the level of deterrence NPAs could offer. A 2016
Global Imputy Index study for Mexico found that "less that 1% of crimes
in Mexico are punished." 123 Because of the high number of businesses
involved in corruption, NPAs that allow many of these companies to get
away with having their charges dropped after compliance may not really
deter corporate entities from further criminal activity.
The vast majority of the Mexican population perceives the courts to
be corrupt and subject to political interference at both state and local
levels. 124 Because of the public perception in Mexico, non-prosecution-
type agreements could likely be perceived as companies using these
agreements to buy off enforcement officials and agencies. This may
result in the Mexican population losing faith in the legitimacy of their
judiciary system. 125 In addition, business executives believe that the
Mexican judiciary system is ineffective in settling challenges to
regulations.126 Due to the lengthy delays of judiciary procedures, long
periods of time may pass before charges are filed or take effect.
Therefore, there is a strong possibility that business executives will
continue their corrupt practices.
There are also limits on market competitiveness because the cost of
doing business in Mexico is higher than in neighboring countries. 127
Because the nature of a corporation includes maximizing profits, by
conducting a cost benefit analysis, some corporations can determine
whether to commit a crime "depending on the difference between the
expected benefits of the offense to the corporation from the offense and
the expected cost of the offense."128 Large businesses making large
profits might determine that any criminal penalties that may be
imposed might be worth paying if it allows them to continue their
unlawful misconduct. Small companies likely have one primary place of
business and do not make substantial profits. Thus, they will be highly
incentivized to implement procedures and compliance programs in
accordance with the law. This does not mean that large corporations
will not comply, as criminal liability falls equally, regardless of the size
of a corporate entity. The fact that DPAs include restitution and other
remedial relief (not just monetary penalties), coupled with the
123. JUAN ANTONIO LE CLERCQ ORTEGA & GERADO RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, GLOBAL
IMPUNITY INDEX MEXICO IGI-MEX 2016, at 14 (2016), translated in http://www.udlap.
mx/igimex/assets/files/igimex20l6_ENG.pdf.
124. See Mexico Corruption Report, supra note 123.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. John T. Byam, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 582, 586-87 (1982).
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acknowledgement of wrongdoing, can deter large corporations from
unlawful actions out of fear of being driven out of business and a fear of
the shame and stigma that is likely to come from the community once
the wrongful action has been brought to light.
There are many reasons why DPAs (or deferred prosecution-type
agreements) can be beneficial to the Mexican government. Under Article
1 Ibis, it is important that companies have certain individuals who monitor
the corporation's conduct. 129 For this to be effective, companies need
compliance practices in place and effective guidelines. The leniency
mechanisms as part of the General Law of Administrative Liabilities is a
great start for the Mexican government. Adopting deferred prosecution-
type agreements can possibly strengthen the government's enforcement
efforts by having corporations at the very least enact compliance and
reporting systems.
V. POSSIBLE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE AROUND NORMS
A. With Respect to substantive issues of corporate criminal liability
Mexico's case law will develop as the government begins to enforce
its amended laws in prosecuting corporations. Mexico is not the only
Latin American country that has recently amended its laws to reflect
the importance of the corporate criminal liability doctrine. In February
2016, Colombia enacted Law 1778, the Transnational Corruption Act,
which allows the government to prosecute corporations for bribes paid
abroad in an effort to strengthen its enforcement regime and curve
corruption. 130 Mexico and Columbia now join many Latin American
countries that impose corporate criminal liability. 131
I propose that the more countries amend their laws to punish
corporations for criminal wrongdoings, the more likely it is that a
convergence toward an implied understanding of the benefits of this
doctrine will arise. As shown from the previous cases, the doctrine
provides a bigger deterrence mechanism when the government punishes
both the individual and the corporation. 132 Punishing individuals in
129. See Alcantra et al., supra note 117.
130. Matteson Ellis, The "TCA": Colombia's New Foreign Bribery Law, FCPAMERICAS
BLOG (April 22, 2016), http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-compliance/tca-
colombias-foreign-bribery-law/.
131. For the exact criminal laws in various countries, including other Latin American
countries not discussed, see Corporate Liability for Corruption Offences in Latin America,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.
oas.org/juridico/pdfs/enccompilation.pdf.
132. See Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative
Annual Conference (Apr. 24. 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa
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some capacity ensures they comply with all laws and regulations, and
by holding the corporate entity vicariously liable, the corporation is kept
from merely terminating the guilty individuals to avoid
responsibility. 133 If there were no vicarious liability imposed, individuals
would be punished with harsher sanctions or penalties. 134 This would
increase the possibility of punishing innocent individuals merely
because the finger has to be pointed at someone "culpable." This
presents another strong justification for why effective deterrence
requires sanctions aimed at the corporation as a whole. 135 In a world of
increasing global business, many corporations have grown and
established themselves on a national level, with high stakes in the
economic and industrial sectors of the world. 136
Many Latin American countries now have laws in place that account
for corporate wrongdoings. Latin America is just one part of the world.
Many other foreign jurisdictions also have some form of the corporate
criminal liability doctrine in their criminal statutes.
The approach in other foreign jurisdictions reflect a convergence in
the norms around the importance of the substantive law of this doctrine
in a variety of industries. In Canada, for instance, the Canadian
Criminal Code imposes a duty on both individuals and organizations to
maintain health and safety regulations for the well-being of individuals
in the workplace. 137 Because most penal offenses under Canadian law
are regulatory offenses, the term "organization" is defined broadly to
include liability imposed on corporations. 138 Similarly, many
jurisdictions in Europe impose regulatory sanctions for the criminal acts
of a corporate entity's employees. 139 For example, the United Kingdom's
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007 allows a
corporation to be found guilty when the corporation's activities show a
gross breach in the duty of care that results in an individual's death. 140
Many countries that impose corporate criminal liability have laws
that are similar to those in the United States. Finish law is very similar
to U.S. law in which criminal liability is imposed when management
/speech/attorney-general-j eff-sessions-delivers-remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-
annual).
133. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 2, at 236.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Tanvi Sharma, Corporate Criminal Liability in the Contemporary World, THE
WORLD J. JURISTIC POLITY 1 (2016).
137. See Norm Keith & Graham Walsh, International Corporate Criminal Liability, 8
WORLD Focus 1, at 19.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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carries out criminal acts for the benefit of the corporation. 141 Austria
and Belgium take the same approach in that the wrongful act must be
done for the benefit of the corporation. 142 While Japan has no corporate
criminal liability doctrine to date, Japanese law will impose corporate
liability when an agent or an employee commits a crime under the
negligent supervision of the corporation. 143 Thus, while Japanese law
has not adopted or enacted an official corporate criminal liability
doctrine, prosecuting a corporation is still possible.
While the countries I have discussed represent only a fraction of the
world, there seems to be a possible global convergence toward this
doctrine. Amendments in the law show how the international regulatory
community is moving toward stricter regulation.144 On March 15-16,
2018, a Global Forum on Corporate Criminal Liability was held in
Konigstein, Germany, to discuss pressing issues regarding corporate
criminal litigation. 145 The Forum brought together leaders in the field
from all over the world to share their perspectives on this area of law
and discuss issues regarding global enforcement and investigation. 146
The forum provides an environment to discuss complex global issues,
offer differing perspectives, and develop solutions to these issues that
work in a variety of jurisdictions. 147
B. Toward a Compliance-Oriented Approach
With globalization and the rapid expansion of information
technologies allowing companies to gain a large amount of control and
influence across the globe,1 4 8 it is important that there is a push towards
compliance-oriented enforcement. In 2016, there were 132 organizations
that were sentenced in the United States, and according to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, only 2.1 percent of those organizations had
effective compliance programs in place. 149
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Global Forum on Corporate Criminal Liability, CAMBRIDGE FORUM,
http://www.gcclforum.com/.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Keith & Walsh, supra note 138, at 1.
149. See Ronald H. Levine & Carolyn H. Kendall, The DOJ's New Parameters for
Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS (July 2017),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/07/01/the-dojs-
new-parameters-for-evaluating-corporate-compliance-
programs/?slreturn 20171019134122.
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More recently, the Department of Justice's Fraud Division has
published the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, which
provides a series of guidelines that it uses when it evaluates a
corporation's compliance program. 150 These guidelines set out eleven
main section topics, each with its own set of questions that the DOJ
asks when evaluating the effectiveness of a compliance program. 151 The
DOJ notes that evaluations are conducted on a case-by-case basis to
account for a corporation's inherent differences, which are taken into
account in the way the questions are subdivided. 152 These guidelines are
strong indicators of the importance of a compliance-orientated approach
since having an effective compliance program is one of the factors that
prosecutors evaluate in determining whether they prosecute a
corporation. 153 Given the discretion that the U.S. Attorney Manual gives
prosecutors, the New Compliance Guidelines Program evaluation serves
as a proper supplement. The parameters of the guidelines include "a
comprehensive overview of compliance program methodologies,
structure and implementation, as well as how the program is
empowered, resourced, and monitored in practice at different
organizational levels." 154 With the DOJs new compliance program in
place, it is important that those at the forefront of corporations become
familiar with these guidelines to ensure their compliance programs
meet standards.
In cases regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), there
also seems to be a recognition of the importance of a compliance-
oriented approach in imposing corporate criminal liability. Former
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Blanco discussed the
importance of cooperation from foreign law enforcement in FCPA
investigations. 155 The FCPA guidelines will be directly applicable to
150. See Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download.
151. See id.
152. See Levine & Kendall, supra note 150.
153. See Christopher D. Carusone, Reducing the Risk of Corporate Criminal Liability,
COHEN SEGLIA PALLA GREENHALL & FURMAN PC: A CLOSER LOOK: INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS (March 21, 2017), https://www.investigationslawblog.com/2017/03/
reducing-risk-corporate-criminal-liability/; See also U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL. § 9-
28.300(5) ("In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and
negotiating plea or other agreements, prosecutors should consider the following factors in
reaching a decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate target ... the existence and
effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing compliance program[.]").
154. See Levine & Kendall, supra note 150.
155. Buckley Sandler, Justice Department Official Stresses International Cooperation in
FCPA Enforcement, BUCKLEY SANDLER (July 28, 2017), https://buckleysandler.com/blog/
2017-07-28/justice-department-official-stresses-international-cooperation-fcpa-
enforcement ("As transnational crime continues to grow in scope and complexity, we
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companies operating in foreign jurisdictions since companies now
operate on a global level. 156
The United States Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC)
now also uses deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution
agreements in their effort to move toward a compliance-oriented
approach. In January 2017, the CFTC granted its first NPA against
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., recognizing that NPAs incentivize
corporations to comply and cooperate in government investigations. 157
The CFTC Enforcement Division stated that it will continue to use
DPAs and NPAs as they are "powerful tool[s] to reward extraordinary
cooperation . ..while providing individuals and organizations strong
incentives to promptly accept responsibility for their wrongdoing." 158
The shift toward a compliance-oriented approach in corporate
criminal liability is also occurring in various foreign jurisdictions in
multiple contexts. In the context of corruption in Latin America, I have
discussed how leniency agreements in Chile 159 and the leniency
mechanisms as part of the General Law of Administrative Liabilities in
Mexico 16 0 are examples of the shift toward a culture of cooperation and
compliance in Latin America. In the United Kingdom, the U.K.
Compliance Guide outlines a compliance system for proper procedures
to curve corporate liability under the U.K. Bribery Act. 161 In addition,
the U.K. conduct regulator issued a series of papers that show the
United Kingdom is striving to establish and maintain a "culture of
conduct" through incentives for regulatory compliance in the financial-
increasingly find ourselves looking across the globe to collect evidence and identify
witnesses necessary to build cases, requiring greater and closer collaboration with out
foreign counterparts. As a result, we find ourselves relying more and more on the use of
the various mechanisms of international cooperation with out foreign partners that permit
for evidence exchange, fugitive apprehension, and asset recover.").
156. See Elisabeth Roscher & Kine Bjelke Christophersen, Corporate Criminal Liability;
The Impact of an Effective Compliance Program, WIKBORG REIN (June 19, 2018),
https://www.wr.no/en/news/news/corporate-criminal-liability-the-impact-of-an-effective-
compliance -program/.
157. See Aitan Goelman, CFTC Non-Pros Agreements with Citibank Traders Reflects
Implementation of New Cooperation Advisories, N.Y.U. PROGRAM ON CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance-enforcement/2017/07/13/
cftc-non-pros-agreements-with-citibank-traders-reflects-implementation-of-new-
cooperation-advisories#more-2077.
158. See id.
159. See Ellis, supra note 104.
160. See Ellis, supra note 119.
161. See UK Compliance Guide, GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL: COMPLIANCE
GUIDES, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/compliance-quick-guides/united
kingdom.
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service industry. 162
In the environmental regulation context, Australian officials have
proposed numerous regulations including environment improvement
plants, operator and pollution risk assessments, and loaded based
licensing schemes to ensure compliance.16 3 Finally, similar to the
recently enacted New Compliance Guidelines Program by the DOJ
Fraud Division, the US-China Business Council has published a Best
Practices of Managing Compliance in China to ensure companies enact
and manage compliance programs.164 With various jurisdictions
enacting compliance programs and guides in various industries, the
goals of criminal law-deterrence and punishment16 5 for corporate
wrongdoings-are being achieved in the United States and numerous
foreign jurisdictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent regulations seem to indicate a possible global convergence
around norms with respect to both the substantive issues that affect
corporate criminal liability and the importance of a compliance-oriented
approach to the problem surrounding the doctrine. The laws enacted in
Latin America suggest that these countries recognize the importance of
the doctrine in ensuring corporate entities are punished for violations of
the law. The recent laws enacted in these jurisdictions suggest a shift
toward regulation of corporate actions and ensures their compliance
with the government laws and regulations. My brief overview of the
laws imposing corporate criminal liability in other foreign jurisdictions
seems to suggest that other countries are also moving toward a
compliance-oriented approach
It is important that corporations enact proper compliance programs
to deter future criminal acts and misconduct. In the United States, the
DOJ has set out guidelines and evaluation standards to ensure that
compliance programs are effective at deterring crime and do not simply
exist on paper. The continued use of DPAs and NPAs will likely
162. See Steve Blackbourn, Embedding the Right Culture and Incentivizing Co-operative
Compliance in the UK, WOLTERS KLUWER (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.wolterskluwerfs
.com/article/embedding-the -right-culture -and-incentivising-co-operative-compliance -in-
the-uk. aspx.
163. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT AND INNOVATION 1-3,
https://www.oeed.org/env/outreach/33947825.pdf.
164. For the full guide, see THE U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, BEST PRACTICES FOR
MANAGING COMPLIANCE IN CHINA (2013), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files
/USCBC%20Compliance%20Report%202013-0.pdf.
165. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 38 (7th ed. 2016).
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continue to be an effective tool for prosecuting corporate entities.
Comments from the current administration suggest that the use of
these agreements will expand and be used in other contexts apart from
common corporate crimes, while ensuring that the result is equitable to
all parties involved. Because many companies have expanded and
operate in multiple jurisdictions, it is extremely important to ensure
their compliance with the law and create a sense of harmony in the
increasingly globalized business world we live in today.

